The National Education Information System (NEIS), initiated by the Ministry of Education (MOE) in Korea, is an electronic system that manages diverse administrative and academic affairs of all the nation's schools and students through the Internet. 
Introduction
The National Education Information System (NEIS) is an electronic data management system that stores schools' educational and administrative matters including admission, budget, and personnel management via the internet. All these are handled by servers built in sixteen educational administration offices across the country that connect all elementary, middle, and high schools. The NEIS case was also a conflict of interests. The most salient feature was the issue of workload reduction. It was true that the beginning stage input demands of NEIS were rather too much, and those were removed later from the system. Afterwards, teachers' unions also suggested the infringement in teacher authority as NEIS provided significant amounts of academic information to inquisitive parents.
The NEIS case was a conflict of values concerning the protection of private information.
The case is significant in that, for the first time, social recognition was placed on the relation between computerization and human rights. It was also the first conflict case after the beginning of the ROH Moo-Hyun government that occurred between the progressive camp, emphasizing the importance of personal information protection, and the conservative camp, 3 which desired administrative efficiency. These background conditions stirred value conflicts and thus made the NEIS case much harder to solve.
Were there any ways that could have solved the conflict with more ease? How can we evaluate the negotiation results? What were wrong with the stakeholders' ways of handling the conflict, and what could have been done differently? To answer these questions, Chapter 2 will introduce the stakeholders and their interests, and then briefly go through how the case unfolded. Chapter 3 investigates the issues and agendas and evaluates the negotiation results.
Chapter 4 presents the evaluation of the conflict management of the stakeholders, and constitutes the main part of the paper. Chapter 5 concludes the article with policy suggestions.
Players and Progress

1) Stakeholders and their interests The Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development (MOE)
The MOE, as the body that initiated NEIS, was confident of the effectiveness that NEIS would bring. At the same time, there was also pressure that the MOE must successfully complete the project it has promised: in June 2001, NEIS was classified as one of the eleven major e-government projects, and thus constrained the MOE to complete NEIS before President KIM Dae-Jung's end of office. As the introduction of the system had been promised repeatedly, giving it up was unthinkable.
The MOE was willing to resolve the NEIS conflict peacefully. The Participatory Government, the nickname for President ROH Moo-Hyun's government, wanted to set a good example of 'dialogue and compromise'. Disagreement was evident even within the MOE.
Minister Kwon, the first MOE minister in the ROH Moo-Hyun government, put 'problem-4 solving' before 'promoting NEIS' since he did not have any attachment to NEIS unlike the other civil servants in MOE.
The Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union (KTU)
KTU represents the most progressive ideology among teachers' organizations. Its position towards NEIS changed drastically when new executives came to office in December 2002. The former executives thought the three main controversial chapters could be included in NEIS provided that the input requirements be simplified. The new executives on the other hand, desired the complete abolition of NEIS or NEIS without the three controversial chapters.
This paper focuses on the interaction between the MOE and KTU because they were two most important players in the NEIS case.
The Korean Federation of Teachers' Associations (KFTA)
The KFTA consists of school management, such as principals and vice-principals. In this regard, the KFTA is considered to be an opponent to KTU in most issues. During 2002, the KFTA first emphasized the need for more preparation before the implementation of NEIS.
However, as the debate unfolded, the KFTA came to strongly support NEIS with a view to reducing the political influence of KTU. KFTA judged that NEIS would offset the influence of KTU. The interest of the KFTA was focused more on weakening the strength of KTU than in the merits of NEIS system itself.
The Korean Union of Teaching and Education Workers (KUTE)
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The KUTE is another labor union of teachers that has traditionally maintained a milder position than KTU in most issues. Therefore, the KUTE did not totally oppose NEIS, but demanded improvement of the system, saying that the required information to be inputted was far more than necessary. The KUTE and KTU have different ideas in many issues, but they have sometimes cooperated with each other as labor unions of teachers. Their relationship has therefore been much better than that between KTU and KFTA.
Other NGOs including "The People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy" (PSPD)
To warn of the possibility of human rights violations from personal information leakage, many other NGOs participated in a joint front for an anti-NEIS platform. Although they did not have interests directly related to NEIS, they wanted to make NEIS case a good precedent that highlighted the importance of personal information protection. The PSPD, a leading NGO in Korea, was one of the major opponents to NEIS. With a start of the ROH Moo-Hyun government in 2003, an ideological conflict became fierce between the conservatives and the progressives, and NEIS was the first tug of war between them.
Parent Organizations
The Parent Organization for Good Education maintained a view similar to KTU in claiming that the rights of parents and students on their information must be protected. On the other hand, the Parent Organization of Love for School had similar opinions with the MOE.
These parent organizations were active in participating and expressing their opinions in many joint problem solving mechanisms such as the Committee for Education Informatization.
Private Firms in the Information Technology Industry
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Private firms also had interests with NEIS project since they could realize billions of won in profit. While enterprises did not directly appear in the debate over NEIS, they did play a role of supplying data that could point in favor of NEIS.
2) Progress of the NEIS project
The NEIS case typically shows the five stages of conflict: before the conflict, rising tension, crisis, settlement, after the conflict. In the meantime, the NHRC recommended that three chapters of school administration/academic affairs, health, and admission/advancement be ruled out of NEIS.
This suggestion was positive news for KTU. The three were only part of twenty-seven chapters of NEIS, but in terms of workload and importance, they were the major chapters that 8 would take 65% of the total input requirement. To the MOE's point of view, NEIS without those three, would therefore virtually be the same as discarding the system altogether. 
Issues, Agendas and the Outcome of the Negotiation 1) Major Issues
There were four main issues in NEIS case. The first was the agenda of human rights and the protection of personal information. KTU and other parties against the system opposed the collection of student information that might violate human rights. The human rights issue, however, was a new subject for the MOE. The issue brought many agendas into concern as will be introduced later.
The second issue was the cost needed to build the system. To cut down on costs, the number of servers had to be reduced. KTU however, wanted one server for each school to reduce the possibility of information leakage. With the assertion that costs should not exceed the original budget of 52 billion won, the old budget became the cost limit for the new NEIS as well.
The third issue was the positive effects that NEIS was expected to bring, such as efficiency of education administration. The fourth issue was the workload of teachers. The MOE explained that the following effects were anticipated from the utilization of NEIS in comparison with the prior C/S (Client Server). However, KTU had different views.
① Workloads for teachers would be reduced due to computerized administration. In response, KTU emphasized that the job of inputting data that had been the responsibility of the teachers in charge of information technology in each school and would be distributed to all teachers, actually resulting in a greater burden for most teachers. Furthermore, with some input requirements not quite necessary for administration, the overall workload might in fact increase instead.
② Administrative services to students and parents would substantially be improved, which the MOE contended would raise public satisfaction. Before NEIS, citizens had to visit their schools or administrative offices of education in order to receive graduation certificates, academic transcripts, and other documents to prove schooling backgrounds. Under NEIS, however, these would be easily available with the use of internet. KTU argued, however, this was just a minor benefit.
③ Parents could check their children's academic and behavioral development without having to actually visit the school. This would also raise transparency in the education administration, the MOE said. Despite such strengths, however, KTU worried about the possible influence parents could exercise over students' records. KTU also stressed the importance of personal meetings between parents and teachers for effective consultation.
④ Electronic documents or digitalized administration would enhance efficiency in education administration. This "paperless office" might even change the conservative culture of schools. The MOE especially emphasized the transparency and efficiency by sending high school students' records on-line to universities for application. KTU, however, said that the online transfer of data would increase the possibility of personal information leakage.
⑤ Accurate and diverse statistical data that NEIS would automatically offer to the government online would improve education policies. In the past, it took weeks to collect data manually and conduct them into statistics. With NEIS, it was expected that information would be available in real-time, with remarkably lower costs and enhanced accuracy. KTU, however, viewed this benefit as the source of the personal information leakage, and it also worried that NEIS would tighten control over teachers by comparing different schools.
During its course of evolution, the NEIS conflict experienced a transition in its major 
2) Agendas and Evaluation of the Negotiation
The following lists the main agendas. Some of the options under each agenda were not actually discussed in the negotiation, but added here to help understand the issues. Option 4. Use client servers for the controversial three chapters, and for the rest, use NEIS.
It can be mistakenly perceived that personal information would be better protected as the number of data-storing servers increase. However, even with thousands of servers, there
would not be significant differences in data protection as long as those servers remain connected to one another. In other words, option 1 and 2 only differed in the number of servers and relevant costs but in fact had no difference either in information protection.
KTU wanted all three chapters to be excluded from NEIS and be managed by C/S method (option 4). The MOE of course preferred option 1, but was ready to accept option 2. For the MOE, however, option 4 was considered to be not much better than the complete abolition of NEIS because the targeted three chapters were the most important part of NEIS.
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The negotiation result was Option 2. The most important point in NEIS negotiations was whether or not the information in the three chapters would be collected and shared on-line. In Option 2, the servers are connected to each other to make the collecting and transferring of information on-line possible. Option 2 can be compared to distributing eggs into many baskets, but with all the baskets tied together. In terms of egg protection, this multi-basket method, despite its higher costs, is not much different from one basket method. Similarly, in terms of information protection, the idea of "splitting servers up" had the same result as one big server. Despite option 2 only increased the cost of establishing more servers, the agreement was made to save the face of KTU because many people believed that separation of the three chapters from NEIS would enhance the information protection. The cost for this face-saving was the wasted government budget.
Why, then, had KTU approved the agreement? First, KTU thought that it could enhance information protection by focusing more on Agenda 2 and 3. It is a well-known principle that the more the agendas, the easier to reach an agreement. Additionally, since NEIS was already widely being used, overturning the situation altogether would have been increasingly difficult.
This delivers the lesson that time can have an opposite implication for each side. Time was not on KTU's side. Finally, with the growing debate on personal information protection and an increase in protection devices, KTU eventually came to share a common understanding that information stealing or leakage was technologically very difficulty. This teaches us the importance in joint fact-finding in the early stage when conflict begins to unfold. Initially, KTU thought it was proper for each school to have their own server (Option 1).
However, building a server at each school was very costly and also required huge workload from teachers. For this reason, KTU later insist on Option 2. On the other hand, those concerned with the costs in establishing more servers preferred Option 5 which required fewer servers.
The result of negotiations was Option 3. As mentioned before, Options 1 through 5 did not significantly differ in terms of private information protection. However, the general public mistakenly thought that more servers meant better protection, and this perception of the public was important for KTU.
Agenda 3: Limit of information sharing for each Input Item
teachers in the same school.
Group B: Shared within the school, but can be transferred outside of the school upon principal's approval.
Group C: Can be provided to other schools or relevant public organizations upon proper authorization.
Since the main feature of NEIS was the flow of information on-line, an input item that is classified to Group A would mean an exclusion from NEIS. On the other hand, Group C information was clearly included in NEIS. KTU wanted as many input items to be categorized in Group A as possible, with information protection in concern. Contrastingly, the MOE desired more inputs in Group C, and Group B was a buffer zone, which played a very important role in settling Agenda 3 and eventually the entire NEIS conflict.
The decision of the Committee for Education Informatization was: A (7%), B (57.6%), and C (30%). Level B was most popular because the health section was classified to B. For instance, the academic ranking of a student was Level C, so that they could be sent to universities. On the other hand, records of disciplinary punishment were Level B, and whether students lived with their parents or not were classified into Level A.
A noticeable fact is that many input items that had been deleted in the agreements of the 
Evaluation 1) Evaluation on Stakeholders The Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development (MOE)
16 First, the MOE did not listen to the stakeholders' voice early enough. Up to 2002, however, the interests of stakeholders were not seriously taken into consideration from the policy formulation stage. NEIS was the first case to bring awareness that an IT project could be a matter over which the government should talk to a labor union like KTU. The MOE was only concerned about launching the system by the end of 2002, and did not take into account opposing viewpoints. Sufficient time is also required to convince the inside members of stakeholder groups, especially when negotiating with an organization such as KTU that is composed of many branches and schools. KTU also had a problem: they talked with the MOE without fully understanding of the effects NEIS would bring. However the MOE also must take some blame since they did not provide enough time and information for KTU.
Secondly, the MOE did not receive full support and trust from other stakeholders. KTU and other groups complained that the decision making processes of the MOE in promoting NEIS was not transparent and influenced by private IT firms. With such circumstances, it was difficult for the MOE to act as a conflict solver.
Thirdly, opinions were divided, even within the MOE. The sudden overturn by the MOE in the May 2003 agreements between the MOE and KTU was caused not only by the objection of the KFTA, but also by the disagreement within the MOE.
Fourthly, the MOE also failed to invite important stakeholders to the bargaining table.
Bilateral agreements were reached with the KTU in May 2003 and September 2004, but both had to be revised with the objection of KFTA. Although KTU was clearly the main party to deal with, the KFTA, which was supporting NEIS, should have also been included in the negotiations. There are too many organizations in the field of education, and this made it difficult for the MOE to select the right people to come to the negotiation table.
Finally, the MOE was not creative enough in formulating an agenda. The conclusion of the NEIS conflict was more or less obvious -in an age where digitalization prevails, an online educational administration system such as NEIS would have to be accepted as a general 17 trend. The major issue was personal information and human rights protection, but these could have been corrected by setting limits to the users of the information. In other words, Agenda 3
should have been the main agenda in the NEIS conflict from the start.
The Korean Teachers & Education Worker's Union (KTU)
KTU, the other pillar in the NEIS case with the MOE, was also poor in managing conflict. As was the MOE, KTU did not put enough effort in to prevent conflict. Although In the first half of 2003, KTU adhered to a hard-line attitude that they would not participate in any meeting if they were not discussing a full-scale removal of NEIS. Although Agenda 3 should have been the key to the conflict, KTU refused negotiation and unilaterally demanded the surrender of the MOE. At that point, however, NEIS was widely used in most of the schools, so complete removal of it was not realistic.
Additionally, the methods of resistance KTU chose were excessive from the view of conflict management. KTU accused the Minister of Education of illegal action, held numerous demonstrations, refused electronic authentications and NEIS inputting, sent letters to international organizations such as the International Labor Organization, and engage in 18 many other activities. Refusing NEIS inputting and electronic authentication were reasonable actions as they were the sources of their bargaining power. However, methods such as suing the Ministers are measures that weakened trust between KTU and the MOE even more. These might seem useful in the short term by putting pressure on the MOE, but it is a saying goodbye to a joint problem-solving. Seeking the assistance from international organizations was not a right decision, as it diminished public support for KTU.
2) Success factors and obstacles
Success factors
After many twists and turns, the NEIS case was eventually resolved. Generally, the most efficient way in negotiation is to settle all agendas at once. However, in a case like NEIS, where dispute is complicated and interests are tangled, a step-by-step approach proved to be more appropriate.
Fourth, time was a factor too. KTU was aware that NEIS was so much widespread that it was very difficult to stop using it. For the MOE, outside pressure was mounting asking for the resolution of the NEIS case before the 2004 general election. Thus, both sides desired to have the problem resolved as soon as possible. As long as the conflict is not progressively worsening, waiting for the right moment for negotiation is one strategy to remember.
Obstacles
The 
Implications and Policy Suggestions
First, conflicts usually have a tendency to grow itself, and it is best to initiate a participatory decision making process as early as possible to minimize social costs from the conflict. For that goal, the concerned parties and their interests in the agenda must be clearly understood. And all stakeholders that can potentially raise objections and delay progress must be included in the negotiation.
Second, it is important to predict the effects of a policy. Up until 2002, many people did not conceive an IT project becoming a matter for labor-management relations. NEIS was also not recognized as an agenda for human rights. In the flow of digitalization, globalization, and democratization, policy makers are required to have more imagination and forethought than 21 ever before. For this reason, training in conflict resolution and negotiation should be strengthened for those who are in public services.
Third, for stake-holders such as the MOE and KTU that negotiate each other over many different agenda, there should be an official meeting on a regular basis. Since there is no official occasion, the MOE is having a hard time in attracting KTU to the negotiation table case by case.
Fourth, the NEIS case proves how important respecting the self-esteem of stakeholders is in conflict management. Face-saving becomes more of a concern for KTU than the interest that they originally fought for. This is why cultural and psychological aspects must be included as well in conflict management.
Last of all, a neutral mediator is necessary in public conflicts. The Office of the Prime
Minister played a mediator's role in the NEIS case, but the OPM cannot be always neutral in all public conflicts, as OPM is also a part of government. Therefore, non-government organizations that understand both the public sector and the conflict management need to be promoted, and the government will have to help create a market for public conflict mediation. 
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NOTES
